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Abstract
The central purpose of this paper is to introduce a new political
economy approach which explains the characteristics of Social Secu-
rity Systems. This approach is based on the Single-Mindedness The-
ory (SMT), which assumes that the more single-minded groups are
able to exert a greater power of influence on Governments and eventu-
ally obtain what they ask. Governments are seen as voting-maximizer
policy-makers, whose unique goal is winning elections. Using an OLG
model and a probabilistic voting approach, I analyse a society divided
into two groups, the old and the young, which only differ for their pref-
erences for leisure. I show that, to win elections, the Government sets
the optimal policy vector taking into account the preferences for leisure
of both groups; eventually, the young gain a fiscal benefit, whilst the
old have such an high marginal tax rate that they prefer to retire and
spend all their time in leisure, a fraction of which is used in undertake
political activities whose aim is the capture of politicians.
JEL Classification: D31, D72, J22, J26
Keywords: probabilistic voting model, single-mindedness, social secu-
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We work in order to have leisure (Aristotle)
1 Introduction
The stylized facts which refer to the workers’ behavior in the U.S. labour
market show that the participation to the labour force of the older persons
has been increasingly declining over the last century. If the labour force
participation of men age 65-69 was around 60% in the 50’s, the same figure
had fallen to 26% in the 90’s. In many OECD countries, workers withdraw
from the labour market well before the official retirement age. Eventually,
this long-term decline associated with an increase in the life expectation
has led to a considerable increase in the retirement years. Otherwise, the
Government expenditure for Social Security has been skyrocketing and so
has been the percentage of workers covered by the System. This situation
runs into risk to become financially unsustainable over the next years, unless
Governments undertake the structural reforms of Social Security Systems as
suggested by many economists (see Feldstein & Liebman [15] amongst the
others).
Over the last few years, the economic literature has been trying to give
plausible explanations to this strong change in the old workers’ lifestyle. Ac-
cording to an OECD survey [34] financial incentives embedded into public
pensions and other assistance schemes pull old workers into retirement. Nev-
ertheless, the OECD makes a distinction between pull factors of retirement
and the push factors of retirement. The former include all those financial
benefits that incentive workers to anticipate their retirement age, whilst the
latter refer to negative perceptions by old workers about their capacity or
productivity and to socio-demographic characteristics.
In this paper I take the distance from the OECD’s vision, which considers
financial benefits as a pull factor to reduce the amount of work. Otherwise,
in accordance with the SMT, I suggest that preferences of workers (espe-
cially the old) for leisure shape the charactertistics of modern Social Security
Systems. Thus, behind the generosity of the transfers by Governments there
is a precise political mechanism, driven by individuals who use their power
of influence over the Government to obtain what they need to finance their
leisure.
I use an OLG model which considers a society divided into two groups
of workers: the old and the young. Furthermore, I assume that there is a
political competition amongst two parties, which aim to maximize the share
of votes and must choose an optimal policy vector which encompasses the
effective marginal tax rates on labour.
The core assumption of the model is based on the idea of “single-mindedness”,
defined as the ability of a social group to be more focused on a single issue
rather than many. The theory was introduced by Mulligan & Sala-i-Martin
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[32] who assumed that the old have more needs for leisure than the young
and this necessity would explain why the the old require (and eventually
obtain) generous transfers by the Government and why the Social Security
expenditures in the U.S. have been increased so much over the last decades.
They adopted an OLG model with a society divided into old and young
workers and showed that
retired elderly can concentrate on issue that relate only to their
age such as the pension or the health system
while the young have to choose among
age-related and occupation issues
Eventually, they concluded,
the elderly are politically powerful because they are more single-
minded and (. . . ) more single-minded groups tend to vote for
larger social security programs that benefit them
Thus, according to this theory, there would exist in the economy a group,
the old workers, which has a sort of political superpower and that enables
it to dictate the optimal taxation (a sort of tyranny of the elder or “Geron-
tocracy”, to quote the author).
Indeed, neither Demographics nor the need for an assistance would ex-
plain the skyrocketing increase in the Governments’ expenditure for Social
Security Systems and the broad reduction in retirement age over the last
decades, but preferences of the old for leisure would provide a more suitable
explanation to this upward trend. In a recent work, Diamond [12], in an
attempt to describe the linkage between the Social Security System and the
retirement in the U.S., wrote in his conclusions:
there is clear evidence from both previous work (. . . ) that the
broad structure of the SS program influences retirement timing.
Evidence on the effects of variation in the benefits provided by
this program is less clear, however.
Over the recent years, economists like Profeta [35] and Mulligan & Sala-i-
Martin [29] have attempted to formalize models involving the SMT but they
all seem to be affected by a fundamental problem due to the use of lump sum
transfers amongst cohorts; in Mulligan & Sala-i-Martin “an interest group
may tax its members with a labour income tax and distribute the proceeds
to them in a lump sum fashion”; Profeta used a lump sum system to trans-
fer wealth both within the cohort and amongst different cohorts. Finally,
also Linbeck and Weibull [27] study a redistributive model with political
competition where gross incomes are fixed and known and, hence, “first-
best (individual) lump-sum redistributions are in principle feasible”. Their
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model represent a remarkable application in economic theory of Hinich [21]
studies on multi-dimensionality of policy space and the first step to over-
come the limitations that previous analysis suffered due to the use of very
restrictive instruments such as the Median Voter Theorem. Neverthless, the
redistributive system these models take into account, with lump-sum taxa-
tion, does not seem to exist in the real world. For instance, Diamond found
out that “The Social Security system in the U.S. today is financed by a pay-
roll tax which is levied on workers and firms equally”, whilst Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin, adopting a cross-section analysis of 89 countries, discovered
that the 96% of Social Security Programs are financed with payroll taxes.
In this paper I will analyse an economic framework where there is a po-
litical competition amongst two candidates which has to choose the optimal
taxation on two social groups, the old and the young. Unlike the previous
models, I will assum that the intergenerational transfer do not take place
via lump sum taxes, but via a more realistic labour taxation. In partic-
ular, I will assume that the Government has to decide how to divide the
revenues generated by the taxation of the two distinct groups. Eventually,
I will demonstrate that the young obtain a positive tax allowance (or a re-
duction of the effective marginal tax rate), whilst a negative tax allowance
(or an increase in the effective marginal tax rate) is levied on the old. This
higher level of taxation on the old provokes a reduction in the labour supply
(and eventually forces the old to retire); a situation which is consistent with
the old needs, since their preferences are more oriented towards leisure than
towards work.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the basic model;
section 3 presents a discussion of the numerical simulations; section 4 pro-
vides some empirical evidence and section 5 concludes.
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2 The basic model
I consider an OLG model, where each generation lives only for two periods,
the youth and old age (see Figure 1).
[FIGURE 1 HERE].
At any period of time, the generation of youths coexists with the genera-
tion of the elderly. At the beginning of the next period, the elderly die,
the youths become elderly and a new generation of youths is born. As a
consequence, there are two overlapping generations of people living at any
one time. Generations are unlinked, meaning that there is no possibility to
leave any bequest. Individuals consume all the available income earned at
a given period of time; thus, it is not possible neither to save nor to borrow
money.
Then, at time t, let a population of size one be partitioned into two
groups of workers, the young, representing the generation born at time t
and denoted by T , and the old, representing the generation born at time
t − 1 and who denoted by T − 1. I will use capital letters to indicate the
group and small letters to indicate single individuals belonging to a group.
The size of a group does not change over time.
Each worker has to decide how to divide his total amount of time t
between work and leisure (denoted by l). If the level of leisure reach 100%,
I assume that the worker retires and gets a benefit equal to pτ−1t . I assume
also that leisure is employed to attend several activities, such as relaxing,
taking care of family, taking part in political activities and many others.
Thus, leisure can be seen as a vector of N activities l = l(l1, l2, ..., lN ),
where ln ≥ 0.
Furthermore, I introduce the core assumptions of the model. I assume
that the old and the young are identical in every respect except one: the
intrinsic value of the old workers for leisure is assumed to be strictly greater
than the same value of the young workers. That is, ψτ−1 >> ψτ , where
Greek letter psi denotes the intrinsic value for leisure. Thus, the two social
groups have different preferences with respect to the choice between work
and leisure.
This assumption is supported by the empirical evidence. The economic
science has produced many works which provide possible explanations to the
existence of a difference in preferences for leisure. Moreover, over the last
years, other social sciences like Sociology and Psychology have added some
very useful contributions. This is why I will distinguish the economic reasons
from the non-economic reasons. The economic reasons are summarized in
the work by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999).
• Differences in labour Productivity. Since the labour productivity is
declining in age, the old are less productive than the young and, as
a consequence, they earn a lower wage. This idea would explain the
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willingness by the old to retire: less productive workers in the labour
market find profitable to devote relatively more of their time and effort
to the political sector as to gain benefits that they would not get if
they relied only on labour market. Nevertheless, for the theory to hold
it is important to assume that leisure devoted to political activities is
a normal good. That is, an increase in the total leisure time entails
an increase in leisure devoted to political activities, due to the income
effect.
• Differences in Human Capital Accumulation. The young are more
engaged in self-financed human capital accumulation while they work
than the old. As a consequence, the value of time for the young may
be higher than their average hourly wage (see Stafford and Duncan
[39]).
• Long-term employment contracts. The empirical evidence shows that
due to the Lazear-type contracts, labour productivity for workers aged
60+ is significantly lower than wages.
As for the non-economic reasons, I refer to a work by Hershey, Henkens
and Van Dalen [20]. In comparing the Dutch with the U.S. Social Secu-
rity System, the authors discovered that “the Americans had significantly
longer future time perspectives, higher level of retirement goal clarity and
they tended to be more engaged in retirement planning activities”. Thus,
these findings are able to explain the existence of socio-cultural differences
in the preferences for retirement. They go on affirming that “American
workers think, prepare and save more for retirement... beginning in early
adulthood”, focalizing on the difference among societies, where there exists
a major difference in financial responsibility, different level of uncertainty
for future pension payouts and different psychological pressures. Finally,
in concluding that the success of political initiatives depends in part on
“changing the dimensions of the psyche that motivate individuals to adap-
tively prepare for old age”, they implicitly recognize that the preferences
of individuals for leisure may endogenously change over time, again due to
cultural and psychological issues.
Old workers’ preferences can be represented by a quasi-linear utility func-
tion2. A representative young worker at time t has the following lifetime
utility function:
U τ−1 = cτ−1t + ψ
τ−1 log lτ−1t (1)
∀ τ − 1 ∈ T − 1
where cτ−1t is the consumption at time t, l
τ−1
t is the leisure at time t and
ψτ−1 is a parameter representing the intrinsic preference of the old worker
for leisure (ψτ−1 ∈ [0, 1]).
2A quasi-linear utility function entails the non existence of the income effect
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The old worker consumes all his income:
cτ−1t = (w
τ−1(1− τL) + aτ−1t τL)(t− lτ−1t ) (2)
where wτ−1 is the unitary wage per hour worked, τL is the tax rate on
labour income (equal for every group and steady over time) and aτ−1t the
level of tax allowance.
Similarly, the preferences of a representative young worker τ are given
by the following lifetime utility function:
U τ = cτt + ψ
τ log lτt + β
τ (cτt+1 + ψ
τ log lτt+1) (3)
∀τ ∈ T
where cτt and c
τ
t+1 represent the consumption at time t and t+1, l
τ
t and
lτt+1 the leisure at time t and t+1, β
τ is the time preference discount factor
of the young worker, ψτ is the intrinsic preference of the young worker for
leisure (ψτ ∈ [0, 1]). Since the young know that at time t + 1 will be old,
their utility function includes the leisure of the next period, weighted by a
discount factor βτ ∈ [0, 1].
The young worker’s inter temporal budget constraint is given by:
cτt + β
τcτt+1 = (w
τ
t (1− τL) + aτt τL)(t− lτt )
+βτ ((wτt+1(1− τL) + aτt+1τL)(t− lτt+1)) (4)
2.1 The Government
The literature has used different formulation for the Government’s objective
function. A typical normative approach considers a benevolent Government
which aims to maximize a Social Utility Function by choosing the optimal
tax rate on labour, subject to a budget constraint where tax revenues are
equal to public good expenditures. Otherwise, some authors such as Ed-
wards and Keen considers a Leviathan model where, referring to the famous
milestone paper by Brennan and Buchanan [5], they examine a Government
which is in part concerned with maximizing the size of the public sector.
Furthermore, the Edwards and Keen model assumes that the Government
retains some degree of benevolence, perhaps because it has re-election con-
cerns. Nevertheless, these concerns were not formally modeled. In this
paper, I provide a possible explanation to this issue, introducing a political
economy model where politicians act in order to maximize the probability of
being re-elected. The policy vector the Government has to choose is given
by:
~q = (aτ−1, aτ )
encompassing the two tax allowances.
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Furthermore, I introduce the budget constraints of the Government:
nτ−1τL(t− lτ−1t )(wτ−1t − aτ−1t ) + nττL(t− lτt )(wτt − aτt ) = 0 (5)
Since revenues are proportional to the amount of labour supplied, the
taxation entails inefficiencies, since it distorts workers’ decisions on the
amount of labour supplied. I assume also that a contingent budget sur-
plus is entirely used to pay pensions to the retirees.
nτ−1τL(t− lτ−1t )(wτ−1t −aτ−1t ) represents total revenues generated by the
taxation of the old at time t, whilst nττL(t− lτt )(wτt −aτt ) the total revenues
generated by the taxation of the young. As suggested by Lindbeck and
Weibull, I assume the existence of a balanced-budget redistribution where the
government cannot redistribute more money than is available in the economy
(in another model I will assume that it is possible to issue debt instead),
and cannot use tax revenues for any purpose other than redistribution so
that the condition nτ−1τL(t− lτ−1t )(wτ−1t −aτ−1t )+nττL(t− lτt )(wτt −aτt ) = 0
says that the revenues obtained via labour taxation are used to redistribute
wealth amongst cohorts. To avoid the case in which a difference in wage
levels is the solely responsible for the existence of retirement I impose that
wages are exogenously determined: wτ−1t = wτt = w. Furthermore, without
loss of generality, I normalize the wage rate to the unity.
2.2 The Density Function in a Probabilistic Voting Model
with Single-Mindedness
2.2.1 The Lindbeck & Weibull framework
As in Lindbeck and Weibull the component of every voter’s welfare depends
on fiscal policies chosen by candidates which affect his consumption and
which is known by both parties, whilst the other component of welfare,
which derives from personal attributes of the candidates, is only imperfectly
observed by the parties. In other words, we are assuming that consumers’
preferences for consumption are perfectly visible, whilst other political as-
pects such as ideology are not (Linbeck & Weibull’s stochastic heterogene-
ity). The presence of uncertainty is fundamental for the existence of an
equilibrium, since in the absence of this assumption, candidates would be
able to perfectly observe workers’ preferences and then we would have a
discontinuous function. In such a case, no equilibrium would exist, for any
policy suggested by a candidate would be beaten by another policy. Indeed,
suppose that overall preferences of voter i ∈ I may be written as:
U i = V i(~q) + piA(ξi + ζ)
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where piA = 1 if candidate A wins the elections and piA = 0 if he loses.
The term ζ reflects the candidate A’s general popularity amongst the elec-
torate. It is not idiosyncratic and it is uniformly distributed on the interval
(− 12h , 12h) with mean zero and density h. Hence, the voter’s choice is deter-
ministic, and it is a discontinuous function of the utility differential between
the two party vector of policies. Otherwise, the term ξi represents an id-
iosyncratic component of voter’s preferences for candidate A and, assuming
that it cannot be exactly observed by parties and that voters are uniformly
distributed on (− 1
2sI
, 1
2sI
), again with mean zero and density sI . Thus, each
voter in group I votes for candidate A if and only if the candidate A’s pol-
icy vector provides him with a greater utility than that provided by the
candidate B’s policy vector. That is:
V i(~qA) + ζ + ξi > V i(~qB) (6)
The assumption that voters care not only about transfers but also have
unobserved exogenous preferences for one candidate assure the existence
of a Nash equilibrium to the electoral-competition in a multi-dimensional
model, according to Lindbeck & Weibull and Dixit & Londregan [13]. The
traditional social choice theory states a negative result when affirms that
any division of resources among cohorts can be beaten in a pairwise vote by
some other division. The existence of preferences with respect to policies
over which the parties cannot easily change position from election to election,
or evaluations of the parties with respect to characteristics such as honesty
and leadership which are valued by all voters (the so called valence issues)
rules out the non-existence of an equilibrium.
2.2.2 The role of swing voters
In each social group there are some swing voters, who are those individuals
that do not have any particular preference for one of the two candidates.
This category of voters is fundamental to evaluate the effect of a change
in the equilibrium policy vector. In fact, suppose to start from a situation
of equilibrium, where the candidate A’s policy, ~qA is exactly equal to the
candidate B’s policy, ~qB; a candidate knows that, should it deviate from
that policy some swing voters will be better off (and vote for him) whilst
some other will be worse off (and vote against him). Thus, in choosing a
policy, a candidate should calculate the number of swing voters which he
would gain and compare it with the number of swing voters he would lose;
intuitively, a change in a policy should be made if and only if a candidate
evaluates that the number of swing voters gained is greater than the number
of swing voters lost. Swing voters in group I are identified by the following
expression:
ξi = V i(~qB)− V i(~qA)− ζ (7)
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This expression affirms that a swing voter is indifferent between candi-
date A and candidate B; otherwise, all the voters with ξjI < ξI vote for
candidate B and all the voters with ξjI > ξI vote for candidate A. I indicate
the share of votes of candidate A in group I with:
piA =
∑
I
nIsI [ξi +
1
2sI
] (8)
and substituting (7) into (8) I obtain:
piA =
h
s
∑
I
nIsI [V i(~qB)− V i(~qA)− ζ] + 1
2
(9)
where s ≡ nIsI . Notice that piA is a random variable since it depends on ζ
which is also random. Thus, the candidate A’s probability of winning is:
A
Pr = Pr[piA ≥ 1
2
] = Pr[
h
s
∑
I
nIsI [V i(~qB)− V i(~qA)− ζ] + 1
2
≥ 1
2
]
and rearranging the terms I obtain:
A
Pr = Pr[piA ≥ 1
2
] = Pr[
h
s
∑
I
nIsI [V i(~qB)− V i(~qA)] ≥
∑
I
nIsIζ]
Similarly, candidate B wins with probability PrB = 1−PrA. In this model,
the probability of winning is thus a function of the distance between the two
electoral platforms.
Definition 1 A pair (qA∗, qB∗) is called a (pure strategy) Nash equilib-
rium (NE) in the expected-plurality game if E(piA − piB|qA, qB∗) ≤ E(piA −
piB|qA∗, qB∗) ≤ E(piA∗ − piB|qA, qB) for all qA, qB which satisfy the budget
constraint.
2.2.3 An endogenous density function
The core assumption of a Single-Mindedness model affirms that the density
function which depicts the distribution of preferences of social groups for
political parties is endogenously determined and depends on some issues. In
other words, it must be the case where over a single issue, different social
groups have different preferences for political parties. In this model the issue
is represented by the total amount of leisure. I assume that on this issue the
two social groups have different visions and preferences for the parties A,B.
For instance, the old may have a ticker distribution function of preferences
than the young. A greater level of Single-Mindedness entails higher values
of the density function which, in this case, tends to assume a ticker shape.
From a statistical point of view, a more single-minded group should have
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a distribution with higer levels of Kurtosis, with respect to a less single-
minded groups. That is the distribution is more “leptokurtic ”3. Figure 2
shows an example of different distributions in a two-issue problem. There
are two groups (red and orange), and two issues (x and y).
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
The figure shows how the distributions of the two groups depend on the
issue and that the red group has a ticker distribution for both the two
issues, that is more single-minded. In this simple case the distribution is
uniform in a closed interval. The broadness of the interval (− 1
2sI
, 1
2sI
) is
endogenously determined: since s is a monotonically increasing function
of the two issues, higher level of the isses increase s and thus reduce the
broadness of the interval. As a result we have an higher level of concentration
of the swing voters around the parameter ζ. Summarizing the previous
concept in a formula, I write the endogenous density function of leisure in a
Single-Mindedness models as:
sI = s(lI) (10)
2.3 The allocation of time amongst different activities
Another core assumption of the model is that social groups devote a fraction
of their time to political activities and that the higher the amount of leisure
spent in political activities, the higher the probability the group is able
to capture politicians and, as a consequence, the higher the probability
of being successful. The main idea that individuals allocate time between
different activities dates back to Gary Becker’s works ([3]) where households
are seen both as consumers and as producers and the amount of activities
undertaken are determined by maximising a utility function subject to prices
and constraints on resources. The great idea by Becker was considering that
consumption activities full cost is equal to the sum of market prices and the
forgone value of the time used up. Thus, a representative consumer solves
the following maximization problem:
maxU = U(li, ..., ln) = Z(x1, ..., xn;T1, ..., Tn)
subject to
g(l1, ..., ln) = l
where g is an expenditure function of li and l is the bound on resources.
The goods constraint is:
n∑
i=1
pixi = I = V + Tww¯ (11)
3Examples of leptokurtic distributions include the Laplace distribution and the logistic
distribution
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where pi is a vector of unit prices, Tw is a vector of hours spent in working
and w¯ is the wage rate per unit of Tw. We have also a time constraint which
can be written as:
n∑
i=1
Ti = Tc = T − Tw (12)
In other words the total available time T may be seen as the sum of total
time devoted to work Tw and total time devoted to consumption activities
Tc which is the sum of time devoted to single consumption activities Ti. Let
us assume now that
Ti ≡ tili (13)
xi ≡ bili (14)
where ti is a vector giving the input of time per unit of li and bi is a
similar vector for market goods. Substituting (13) into (12), (12) and (14)
into (11) we obtain:
n∑
i=1
(pibi + tiw¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pii
li = V + Tw¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
(15)
pii represents the sum of the unitary prices of the goods and of the time
spent for li. Let us now denote the full income (the maximum money income
achievable) by S; this can be seen as the sum of the total labour earnings
I and the total earnings forgone in devoting time to consumption activities
L. Thus:
L(l1, ..., ln) ≡ S − I(l1, ..., ln)
which can also be re-written as:
n∑
i=1
pibili + L(l1, ..., ln) ≡ S (16)
The equilibrium conditions resulting from maximising the utility func-
tion subject to (16) are:
Ui = T (pibi + Li) (17)
where pibi is the direct and Li the indirect component of the total marginal
price pibi + Li.
Describing more in details the basic elements of the workers’ decision
problem in this model, I assume that leisure is a vector ~l of N activities
which can be undertaken in the spare time (indexed by n = 1, ..., N). One
of these activities is lobbying politicians, which I will denote with lp. In
order to undertake such an activity some inputs such as knowledge of polit-
ical situation, telephone calls and time are required. Suppose now to denote
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all the other consumption activities apart from lobbying with l−p. Figure 3
shows the equilibrium we find (denoted with k), where the slope of the full
income opportunity curve, which is equal to the marginal prices and would
be equal to slope of an indifference curve (equals to marginal utilities).
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
If we analyse the problem from a microeconomic perspective, the con-
sumption set of activities that can be undertaken may be written as: L =
<N+ = l ∈ <N : ln ≥ 0 for n=1,...,N where L is convex set. Each activity can
be written as:
li = fi(xi, Ti) (18)
where xi is a vector of inputs which are necessary to undertake the activity
and Ti a vector of time inputs using in performing the activity. The partial
derivatives of li with respect to both xi and Ti are non-negative, that is
∂li
∂xi
≥ 0 and ∂li∂Ti ≥ 0.
If we look at leisure as a vector of activities, then (10) may be written
as:
~s = s(~l(l1, l2, ..., lN )) (19)
Furthermore calculating derivatives:
∂sl(l1,l2,...,lN )
∂l(l1, l2, ..., lN )
∂l(l1, l2, ..., lN )
∂ln
> 0 (20)
Equation (20) says that the density function is monotonically increasing in
leisure devoted to political activities. By the meaning of the chain rule we
can divide the expression in two terms. The first term ∂l(l1,l2,...,lN )∂ln represents
the effect of an increase in leisure devoted to political activities on total
leisure and it is positive. Otherwise, the term ∂s
l(l1,l2,...,lN )
∂l(l1,l2,...,lN )
represents the
effect of an increase in total leisure on the density function, which represents
an indicator for the group cohesion and for the group political power. Also
this term is positive, since an increase in time devoted to political activities
is likely to increase the power of influence of a group. In this view the leisure
spent by individuals in political activities can be seen as an investment in
time, whose return is represented by the benefit they get from politicians.
In turn, the endogenous density may be seen as a measure of the group’s
single-mindedness; the higher the density of the group, the higher the single-
mindedness and vice versa. This assumption would explain why those issues
or preferences that are more commonly shared by individuals are politically
more successful.
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2.4 A three-stage game
I consider a three-stage game where two candidates, say A and B, wish to
maximize their number of votes to win elections 4. Both of them have an
ideological label (for instance they are seen as “Democrats”or “Republicans
”). I assume that this label is exogenously given.
In the first stage of the game, the two candidates, simultaneously and
independently, announce (and committ to) a policy vector, ~qA and~qB.
In the second stage of the game elections take place. A candidate wins
elections if and only if it obtains the majority of votes; in the case of a tie a
coin is tossed as to choose the Government which will come to power. Fur-
thermore, I assume that each party prefers to stay out from the competition
than to enter and lose, that prefers to tie than stay out and it prefers to win
than to tie.
Finally, in the third stage of the game, workers choose their work and
leisure level, given the level of allowances chosen by the Government.
2.5 The equilibrium
I solve the game by backward induction, starting from the final stage.
A representative old worker solves the following optimization problem:
maxU τ−1 = cτ−1t + ψ
τ−1 log lτ−1t
s.t. cτ−1t = ((1− τ τ−1Lt ) + aτ−1t τ τ−1Lt )(t− lτ−1t )
Solving with respect to lτ−1t I obtain an expression for the optimal labour
supply:
lτ−1∗t =
ψτ−1
(1− τ τ−1Lt ) + aτ−1t τ τ−1Lt
(21)
and substituting into (1) I obtain an expression for the Indirect Utility Func-
tion:
V τ−1t = t((1−τ τ−1Lt )+aτ−1t τ τ−1Lt )−ψτ−1+ψτ−1 logψτ−1−ψτ−1 log((1−τ τ−1Lt )+aτ−1t τ τ−1Lt )
(22)
I do the same for the representative young worker:
max U τ = cτt + ψ
τ log lτt + β
τ (cτt+1 + ψ
τ log lτt+1)
s.t. cτt +β
τcτt+1 = ((1−τ τLt)+aτt τ τLt)(t−lτt )+βτ ((t−lτt+1)((1−τ τLt+1)+aτt τ τLt))
lτ∗t =
ψτ
(1− τ τLt) + aτt τ τLt
(23)
4Lindbeck and Weibull 1987 and Dixit and Londregan 1996 demonstrated that the
Nash equilibrium obtained if candidates maximize their vote share is identical to that
obtained when candidates maximize their probability of winning
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V τ = t((1− τ τLt) + aτt τ τLt)− ψτ + ψτ logψτ −−ψτ log((1− τ τLt) + aτt τ τLt)
+aτt τ
τ
Lt) + β
τ (t− ψτ )((1− τ τLt+1) + aτt τ τLt) + βτψτ (logψτ ) (24)
In the second stage of the game elections take place. It is easy to verify
that the elections’ outcome is a tie. The proof arises from the resolution
of the first stage, where it will be demonstrated that in equilibrium, both
parties choose an identical policy vector.
In the first stage, the two candidates choose their policy vectors. They
face exactly the same optimization problem and maximize their share of
votes or, equivalently, the probability of winning. The resolution is made
for candidate A, but it also holds for candidate B.
max piA =
1
2
+
h
s
∑
I={T−1,T}
nIsI [V i(~qA)− V i(~qB)]
nτ−1τL(t− lτ−1t )(wτ−1t − aτ−1t ) + nττL(t− lτt )(wτt − aτt ) = 0
I provide a complete resolution to the problem in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium both candidates’ policy vectors converge to
the same platform; that is ~qA = ~qB = ~q∗.
Proof : ~q∗ represents the policy which captures the highest number of swing
voters. Instead, suppose there exists other two policies ~q′ and ~q′′; in moving
from ~q∗ to ~q′ (or ~q′′) a candidate loses more swing voters than those it is
able to gain. Thus, suppose a starting point where candidate A chooses ~q′
and candidate B chooses ~q′′ such that in choosing ~q′ and ~q′′ the elections
outcome is a tie. If one candidate moved toward ~q∗, it would be able to gain
more swing voters than those it loses and thus, it would win the elections.
So, choosing any policy but ~q∗ cannot be an optimal answer. The only one
policy which represents a Nash Equilibrium is ~q∗ since it is the intersection
between the optimal answers of the two candidates and no one candidate
has an incentive to deviate. Since each candidate maximizes its share of
votes, in equilibrium the two candidates receive both one half of votes; if
one candidate should receive less than one half of votes it would always have
the possibility to adopt the platform chosen by the other candidate and get
the same number of votes. Notice that what we found here is the multidi-
mensional analogue of Hotelling’s principle of minimum differentiation.
Corollary 1 The utility levels reached by workers are the same; that is:
V iA = V iB.
Proposition 2 The marginal tax rate on labour is equal for both groups but
the tax allowance is more beneficial for the group of the young.
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Proof : obtained via numerical simulations. See Table 2 and 3 and 4in
Appendix 1.
Proposition 3 The optimal allowances are a function of the numerosity
and density of both groups, of the marginal tax rate, of the total amount of
time and the parameters representing the preferences of groups for leisure.
That is aIt = a(s
I , s−I , nI , n−I , t, ψI , ψ−I).
Proof : see Appendix 1.
Thus, the political economy framework suggests that tax rates should
be differentiated, as stated by Proposition 2. Indeed, if the traditional nor-
mative approach suggests that a benvolent Governments should tax less the
poorest social groups, the political economy approach suggests that in a
real world vote-seeker Governments tax groups according to their ability to
threat politicians in the electoral competition.
Proposition 4 All the old retire, whilst the young have a positive labour
supply.
Proof : see Appendix 1.
Corollary 2 Tax revenues collected via the labour taxation on the young
are positive; tax revenues generated via the labour taxation on the old are
equal to zero.
Proof : It derives from Proposition 2 and 4.
Thus, even though the tax allowances favour the young, the fiscal system
forces the old to pay such an high tax rate that they decide to retire. As a
consequence, the revenues on the old cannot be other than zero, whilst the
the tax revenues on the young are positive and the magnitude represent the
total amount of pensions the old receive.
Corollary 3 The old workers are more single-minded than the young (sτ−1 >
sτ ).
Proof : The results derive from the assumption that the density function is a
monotonically increasing one in leisure (s = s(l)). Since the old obtain more
leisure in equilibrium, the density is higher and, by definition, the group is
more single-minded.
Finally, the Lagrange multiplier has a political meaning: it represents the
increase in the probability of winning for a candidate, if it had an additional
dollar available to spend on redistribution.
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3 Numerical Simulations
Numerical simulations was made since an analitical solution for the system
to be solved is hard to achieve. Indeed, to get the optimal policy vector
we have to solve a system of three equations with three unknonwns (the
two tax allowances and the Lagrange multiplier). Nevertheless, also this
process suffers from some problems. First of all, the simultaneity. We have
assumed that the density function is endogenous in leisure; this implies that
we should know the value of the density only after having calculated the
optimal level of leisure which depends on the level of taxation which is what
we want to evaluate. A possible way out for this problem is to guess a value
for the density function and assess that the level of leisure is compatible
with the value of the density only once the system was solved; in other
words, if we assume that the density is monotonically increasing in the level
of leisure, we have to find higher levels of leisure for the group of the old on
which we have attributed an higher level of density. If this did not happen it
would mean that our guess is wrong and the SMT fails. Secondly, the value
of exogenous variable should be realistic, but unfortunatly it is difficult to
attribute a real value to some parameters such as the preferences of workers
for leisure. Furthermore, given the levels of tax allowance of the young, the
tax allowance of the old comes from a second-order equation and thus we
must exclude some solutions from the set of total solutions.
3.1 Main Findings
Main results are reported in table 1-3. Tables 1.a, 2.a and 3.a report the
matrix of inputs, whilst tables 1.b, 2.b and 3.b the matrix of outcomes. We
may see two important results: the tax allowance for the young is greater
than the tax allowance for the old (compare the last column of tables x.a
with the first column of tables x.b) and the leisure of the old is greater than
the leisure of the young (compare the second and the third columns of tables
x.b). Finally, the revenues genrated by the taxation of the young are always
higher than the revenues generated by the taxation of the old (compare the
fourth and fifth columns of tables x.b). These results are rather obvious if
we consider that taxation of labour is the only instrument the Government
has to force workers to reduce or increase their labour offer. In this case,
since the old prefer to reduce labour more than the young, the Government
imposes a taxation system which entails higher fiscal benefits for the young.
Nevertheless, the taxation system is not the only reason why the old offer
less labour; also the parameter of preference for leisure ψ is fundamental to
determine the labour supply. In the simulation this parameter is supposed
to be greater than 12 for the old and less than
1
2 for the young. The fact that
the revenues generated by the taxation on the young are always higher that
those generated by the taxation on the old (which eventually will be equal
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to zero since all the old will be retired), even though the young gain a fiscal
benefit, is mainly due to the value assumed by the parameter representative
of worker preferences for leisure. This results do not intend, obsviously, to
replicate exactly the right number we may find in reality, as for tax rates,
allowances and so on. For instance, it appears not realistic to adopt high
tax rates or so high levels of taxation to force all the workers to retire.
4 Theory and evidence: a review
In this section I review some of the empirical evidence found in the litera-
ture which may support the SMT. I remind that if the SMT was right, we
should observe in reality high levels of retirement within the old workers ac-
companied by high marginal tax rates on labour. I will mainly focus on the
U.S. case referring to recent works by Peter Diamond (1997) and Mulligan
& Sala-i-Martin (1999).
4.1 The Unceasing Decrease in labour Market Participation
Around the World
According to Diamond, the stylized facts would show that the participa-
tion of the older persons in the labour market has been gradually declining
over the 20th century. For instance, in 1950 almost 60% of men age 65-69
partecipated in the labour force, while by 1990 this figure had fallen to 26%.
Otherwise, the percentage of workers covered by SS System has significantly
rose over the same period. There has been also a dramatic increase in the
share of the older population receiving payments from public schemes. Thus,
it seems there would exist a strong linkage between SS System and incentive
to retirement. To verify this linkage he analysed the hazard rate, defined as
the increase in the rate of labour force leaving from the previous age, relative
to the stock of workers participating at the previous age. The trend, both
for males and females, shows the suggestive existence of two spikes around
age 62, the age of eligibility for early retirement under Social Security and
age 65, which is the legal retirement age. Trying to give an explanation
to this phenomenon, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin note that the Government
retirement ages have not risen with an augmented life expectancy and a
bettering in health, since we would expect the fraction of GDP devoted to
public programs for the old to increase less than one-for-one, because the
deadweight losses associated with SS taxes presumably increases with re-
spect to an increasing rate, while in the real world this ratio varies exactly
one-for-one with the fraction of the population over age 60. Secondly, the
Social Security have mostly pay-as-you-go features, which means that an
intergenerational transfer always exists. Identical results were achieved by
Ruzik [38], which analised the retirement bahaviour in Poland, Hungary and
Lithuania; the main result of the econometric analysis was that becoming
18
unemployed at older age is a strong factor increasing probability of retire-
ment and that there exists a strong linkage between retirement and the
right to get a social security benefit in advanced age. Aguiar [1] tried to
go more in details in anlasying the allocation of time; he confirmed results
obtained by previous literature that time devoted to leisure has increased
significantly in the United States over the last five decades, but he made a
further effort to disaggregate uses of household time into specific categories,
namely market work time, non-market time and leisure time. The market
work time is represented by a core market work (main jobs, second jobs,
overtime, time spent working at home) plus time spent commuting to/from
work and time spent on ancillary work activities (i.e. eating a meal); the
study shows that this category has been remaining costant between 1965
and 2003, even though with a difference between men and women work.
The non-market work encompasses activities such as household activities
(i.e. cleaning, ironing, vacuuming), time spent obtaining goods and services
(i.e. shopping) and time spent on other home production (i.e. gardening,
vehicle repair). In this case, time spent in these activities has fallen sharply
over the same period of time. Otherwise, leisure time, consisiting in the
residual of work activities has been increased significanlty. Huovinen and
Piekkola [22], in a study on early retirement and use of time by older Finns,
argued that factors related to labour demand, in addition to personal fi-
nancial incentives and health, are very important in determining the early
retirement in Finland and that changes in how leisure time is valued explain
the level of withdrawal from labour market. Finally Dorn & Sousa-Poza [9],
analysing early retirement in Switzerland, discovered that early retirement
positively depends on the level of wealth, the level of education, a negative
attitude toward the job, preferences toward leisure and retirement incentives
provided by firms. Thus, it seems that an hihg level of accomulated wealth
entails a higher probability to retire. Table 1 shows the dramatic decline
in the employment of older workers as a fraction of male populations which
occured in some OECD countries over the last five decades. Except Japan,
partecipation rates have been declining from above 80 percent to below 50
percent.
Table 1 - Employment of male workers at age 55 to 64 as a percentage of
male populations of the same age
1980 1990 1995 2000
Belgium 47.7 34.3 34.5 35, 1
Canada 71.3 60.3 53.7 57.7
France 65.3 43.0 38.4 38.5
Germany 64.1 52.0 48.2 48.2
Japan 82.2 80.4 80.8 78.4
United Kingdom 62.6 62.4 56.1 59.8
United States 69.7 65.2 63.6 65.6
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Source: Fenge & Pestieau (2005)
4.1.1 Early Retirement: Free Choice or Forced Decision?
As we have demonstrated in the previous point, data referring to retirement
show a clear downward trend in labour market participation. Then, a nat-
ural question arises: do people voluntarely retire earlier or are they forced
to retire from labour market conditions? This question still has not found
a robust answer, since it would require a perfect knowledge about individ-
ual preferences for retirement which we do not actually have. Nevertheless,
find an answer to this question would be fundamental to understand how
workers react to a change in social security system variables, such as an
increase in the legal retirement age, the transition from a PAYG System
to a Fully Funded System or any other pension reform. The imporance of
being able to answer this question is highlighted by the following example:
imagine to introduce a policy which aims to supply education to the elder
workers; if their preferences are such that they only desire to retire to en-
joy more leisure rather than to work, probably these measures would not be
much effective; otherwise, suppose retirements take place due to labour mar-
ket reasons (i.e. a negative economic trend which forces firms to incentive
workers exodous, bad perception the old have about their ability to per-
morm a job, and so forth); in this case a good intervention by Governments
in Social Security policies would stimulate workers to withdraw from earlier
retirement. Strange enough, the economic literature has not been focusing
so much over this issue. The main stream of literature on early-retirement
believes that to understand workers’ retirement decisions, we must focus on
the labour-supply side; the main evidence this theory achieved is that earlier
and more generous availability of public old-age benefits (or more generous
early retirement regulations) tend to increase early exits from the labour
market, since early retirement becomes a more attractive choice for individ-
uals. Thus, labour-supply economists believe that early retirement is more
a free choice than a forced decision. Empirical evidence about the retire-
ment incentives (see Fenge & Pastieu [17], Coile & Gruber [6] and Gruber
& Wise [19]) found that retirement incentives are strongly related to early
retirement, that most wealthy people, that is people who would have more
opportunities to continue to work, are more likely to retire earlier, and that
workers are more likely to prefer retirement to work as they get old. Other-
wise, the labour-demand side perspective has not received the same attention
and only in more recent years has gained interest among economists. In this
case, early retirement is seen more as a forced decision than a free choice.
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4.1.2 Are preferences for leisure of the old higher than those of
the young?
In the model I assumed that the intrinsic preference for leisure of the old were
higher than that of the young (ψτ−1 > ψτ ). This assumption is the most
difficult to verify, since it entails a complete knowledge about preferences
of individuals which actually we do not have. Thus, this evaluation must
take place adopting indirect proxies. A study by McGrattan & Rogerson
[28] analysed changes in hours worked since 1950 for different demographic
groups. They discovered that despite the average weekly hours worked per
person at the aggregate level has not substantially changed over the period
and college enrollments over the monitored period increased, the number of
weekly hours worked by individuals aged 15-24 increased nearly 10 percent
and the number of hours worked by individuals aged 25-54 increased about
20 percent; otherwise, hours worked by workers aged 55-64 fell 6.5 percent
and those of workers aged 65-74 fell 57 percent. Thus, it seems that U.S.
labour market has experimented a reallocation of hours worked among co-
horts5. This result seems to confirm our assumption: the young prefer to
work, although they have to invest in human capital while they are under 30,
whilst the old over 50 prefer to retire. Despite the classical motivations the
literature has brought to explain this phenomenon, it seems there also exist
a “natural”tendency to retire soon after the middle age due to biological
reasons.
4.1.3 How do retirees use their leisure?
In the model I assumed that the the old have a higher level of preference
for leisure than the young (ψτ−1 >> ψτ ) and I provided some theories
which may support this hypothesis. The empirical evidence seems to confort
theoretical results. Huovinen and Piekkola suggest that leisure allocation is
a highly significant factor explaining retirement decisions and that not only
the overall increase in leisure makes retirement more attractive but also the
way this increased leisure is allocated. Results of the survey shown that the
share of more active activities is higher amongst the non-employed, while
passive activities (i.e. watching television, reading books and so forth) is
higher amongst the empoloyed. In my opinion, an interesting consideration
stated in this study is that the actively used leisure time works a substitute
for decreased income to work.
5monitoring disaggregate data among cohorts was essential to challange the classical
theory by Prescott, who sustained looking at aggregate values that elasticity of substitu-
tion between consumption and leisure was near 1
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4.2 SS System and Marginal Tax Rates
According to Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, if we take into account the time
pattern of tax/subsidy rates across earning groups, we would see that before
age 62 the tax rate is higher, the higher is the wage earned by workers. For
instance, consider a single worker with a last year of work equal to 55; the
calculated tax rate is equal to 4.3%. Consider again a single worker, but this
time with a last year of work equal to 69; this time, the tax rate is equal to
44.2%. Finally, to discourage working, some countries tax the labour income
of the elderly at 100% rates. Some example are derived from Spain and
Belgium where “elderly are not allowed to collect their government pension
if they earn any labour income at all and those benefits are typically close to
or more than what the pensioner would have earned after taxes if he had kept
working ”. Otherwise, France “allows pensioners to receive labour income,
but not from their preretirement occupation ”. Furthermore, the authors
evaluate that the size of the public pension benefits in some countries are
nearly the size of the average worker’s earnings and thus the range of income
to which the 100% implicit tax rate is very large. But the most effective
explanation about the high tax rate applied on the old refers to the free
riding problem within a group. In this view, considering selfish individuals
who does not care about interests of other members, the existence of high
tax rates on labour income could be seen as a measure undertaken by the
group itself to overcome a free-riding threat; thus, it would be the group
itself which forces the Government to impose high tax rates in order to
induce members to retire so that they can spend part of their leisure in
political activities in order to protect the group’s interests.
4.3 The Political Economy of Early Retirement
The recent trend which refers to early retirement is something of unaccept-
able from a normative perspective. How can we justify policies which favour
early retirement, when due to demographical causes and financial troubles
the actual social security systems are universally considered unsustainable?
The normative theory states that to meet financial problems and improve-
ments in longevity the retirement age should be raised. Actually answers
should be found in the political economy. According to recent studies (see
Jacobs and Shapiro [23], Ferrera [14], and Boeri, Borsch-Supan & Tabellini
[4]) it seems that both in the U.S. and in Europe the majority of people
are against higher payroll taxes, lower benefits, and a higher retirement age.
Surveys show that European citizens are neither happy with the existing
programs nor willing to reform the welfare state. Even though the evidence
about the political economy of early retirement seems to be clear and ro-
bust, we still lack of models which are able to explain the phenomenon.
Even recent models (see Fenge & Pestieau [17]) seem to suffer from mispec-
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ification problems; indeed, in the model of political choice, individuals vote
on a mandatory age of retirement, maximising a lifetime utility function
where the age of retirement negatively affects the utility of voters. This
seems incorrect, because an higher retirement age increases the monetary
value of consumption; that is, consumption is a function of time spent in
working. Furthermore, consumption is a monetary variable while the age of
retirement is a time variable and, again, it seems quite incorrect to sum a
monetary variable with a time variable. Finally, the model does not take
into account the value of leisure, which is, in my opinion, the key point to
understand the political economy of early retirement. In fact, an higher
age of retirement increases the monetary value of total consumption, but
decreases the value of total leisure. To understand why voters seem to be
unwilling to increase the retirement age we have to find answers in individ-
ual preferences. If we assume that working more means to have less leisure,
as it is obvious, then people do not accept to work more simply because
the monetary value of the consumption due to an increase in working time
is lower than the monetary value of leisure. It is not the age of retirement
per se which reduces the individual’s utility but the reduced values of total
leisure which an increase in the retirement age produces, instead.
5 Conclusions
I introduced a political economy model which analysis the optimal taxation
problem when candidates are supposed to be voter-seekers which aim to
maximize the probability to win elections in a society characterized by dif-
ferent social groups. I derived the optimal taxation structure in a framework
characterized by overlapping generations; I demonstrated that the optimal
taxation on labour depends on the preferences of a group towards leisure,
which must be used as a proxy for the single-mindedness of that group. One
of the most interesting conclusion the model achieves states that eventually
the young receive a positive fiscal benefit, even though they have to pay
higher tax revenues. Finally, I demonstrated that, due to the features of
fiscal system, the leisure of the old is so high that it also induce all the
old to retire; this result is not only theoretical by also holds in reality; the
situation around the OECD countries shows that the retirement age has
increasingly reduced over the last decades and this is due to the generosity
of social security services and the strucure of fiscal systems. Nevertheless,
studies on the application of the SMT to the labour market are at the very
beginning and they open new interesting fields of research. This model is far
from being able to explain the relationship between social groups’ behavior
and labour market characteristics. For instance, it would be interesting to
analyse more in details the role of institutions, such as labour unions or as-
sociation of retirees on the political outcome; another field of research could
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study the conflicts among unions and employers endogenizing the bargaining
power of the two social groups according to the single mindedness theory’s
assumptions. Finally, this model does not take into account any issue which
refers to savings; it would be useful to analyse the effect of savings in dif-
ferent pensions schemes, such as the PAYG or the Fully-Funded systems. I
hope that these issues could be analyzed in future works.
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7 Appendix 1
In this Appendix I provide a complete resolution to the candidates’ problem. The two
candidates face exactly the same optimization problem; they maximize their share of votes
or, equivalently, the probability of winning. The resolution is made for candidate A, but
it also holds for candidate B.
max piA =
1
2
+
h
s
∑
I={T−1,T}
nIsI [V i(~qA)− V i(~qB)]
T1 ≡ nτ−1τL(t− lτ−1t )(1− aτ−1t ) + nττL(t− lτt )(1− aτt ) = 0
I write the Lagrangian function:
L =
1
2
+
∑
I={T−1,T}
nIsI [V i(~qA)− V i(~qB)] + λ (T1)
I obtain the following first order conditions which may be seen as a modified version of
the original Lindbeck and Weibull first order conditions:
(1) ∂L
∂aτ−1
t
≡ nτ−1 ∂sτ−1
∂lτ−1
t
∂lτ−1
t
∂aτ−1
t
(V τ−1A − V τ−1B) + nτ−1sτ−1( ∂V τ−1
∂aτ−1
t
) = λ ∂T (1)
∂aτ−1
t
(2) ∂L
∂aτ
t
≡ nτ ∂sτ
∂lτ
t
∂lτt
∂aτ
t
(V τA − V τB) + nτsτ ( ∂V τ
∂aτ
t
) = λ ∂T (1)
∂aτ
t
(3) T (1) = 0
According to the result stated in Corollary 1, FOC’s can be re-written in the following
manner:
(1) ∂L
∂aτ−1
t
≡ nτ−1sτ−1( ∂V τ−1
∂aτ−1
t
) = λ ∂T (1)
∂aτ−1
t
(2) ∂L
∂aτ
t
≡ nτsτ ( ∂V τ
∂aτ
t
) = λ ∂T (1)
∂aτ
t
(3) T (1) = 0
and after some easy calculations, I obtain:
(1) nτ−1sτ−1(tτL+ ψ
τ−1τL
(1−(1−aτ−1
t
)τL)
)−λ( (1−a
τ−1
t
)τ2Lψ
τ−1nτ−1
(1−(1−aτ−1
t
)τL)
2 )−nτ−1τL(t− ψ
τ−1
(1−(1−aτ−1
t
)τL)
)) =
0
(2) nτsτ (tτL +
ψτ τL
(1−(1−aτ
t
)τL)
)− λ( (1−a
τ
t )τ
2
Lψ
τnτ
(1−(1−aτ
t
)τL)
2 − nττL(t− ψ
τ
(1−(1−aτ
t
)τL)
)) = 0
(3) T (1) = 0
From (1) and (2) obtain:
λ =
nτ−1sτ−1(t+ ψ
τ−1
(1−(1−aτ−1
t
))
)
(
(1−aτ−1
t
)τLψ
τ−1nτ−1
(1−(1−aτ−1
t
)τL)
2 )− nτ−1(t− ψ
τ−1
(1−(1−aτ−1
t
)τL)
))
=
nτsτ (t+ ψ
τ
(1−(1−aτ
t
))
)
(
(1−aτ
t
)τLψ
τnτ
(1−(1−aτ
t
)τL)
2 − nτ (t− ψτ(1−(1−aτ
t
)τL)
))
Solving this system of equations analitically is a very difficult task. This is why I
performed some numerical simulations instead. In the following tables the main results
are reported.
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Table 2.a - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with Mathematica 5.2 -
Input Matrix (τ = 0.3)
nτ−1 nτ τL t ψτ−1 ψτ sτ−1 sτ aτt
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 −1
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 −0.9
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 −0.8
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 −0.7
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 −0.6
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 −0.5
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 −0.4
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 −0.3
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 −0.2
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 −0.1
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 0
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 0.1
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 0.2
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 0.3
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 0.4
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 0.5
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 0.6
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 0.7
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 0.8
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 0.9
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 1
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Table 2.b - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with Mathematica 5.2 -
Output Matrix (τ = 0.3)
aτ−1t l
τ−1
t l
τ
t T
τ−1
t T
τ
t
−0.6666 1(ret) 0.5 0 0.15
−0.6740 1(ret) 0.4651 0 0.1524
−0.6745 1(ret) 0.4347 0 0.1526
−0.6694 1(ret) 0.4081 0 0.1509
−0.6596 1(ret) 0.3846 0 0.1476
−0.6456 1(ret) 0.3636 0 0.1431
−0.6277 1(ret) 0.3448 0 0.1375
−0.6062 1(ret) 0.3278 0 0.131
−0.581 1(ret) 0.3125 0 0.1237
−0.5521 1(ret) 0.2985 0 0.1157
−0.5194 1(ret) 0.2857 0 0.1071
−0.4824 1(ret) 0.2739 0 0.0980
−0.4408 1(ret) 0.2631 0 0.0884
−0.3939 1(ret) 0.2531 0 0.0784
−0.3408 1(ret) 0.2439 0 0.068
−0.28 1(ret) 0.2352 0 0.0573
−0.2094 1(ret) 0.2272 0 0.0463
−0.1256 1(ret) 0.2197 0 0.0351
−0.0224 1(ret) 0.2127 0 0.0236
0.1140 1(ret) 0.2061 0 0.0119
0.3333 1(ret) 0.2 0 0
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Table 3.a - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with Mathematica 5.2 -
Input Matrix (τ = 0.4)
nτ−1 nτ τL t ψτ−1 ψτ sτ−1 sτ aτt
0.5 0.5 0.4 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 −1
0.5 0.5 0.4 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 −0.9
0.5 0.5 0.4 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 −0.8
0.5 0.5 0.4 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 −0.7
0.5 0.5 0.4 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 −0.6
0.5 0.5 0.4 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 −0.5
0.5 0.5 0.4 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 −0.4
0.5 0.5 0.4 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 −0.3
0.5 0.5 0.4 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 −0.2
0.5 0.5 0.4 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 −0.1
0.5 0.5 0.4 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 0
0.5 0.5 0.4 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 0.1
0.5 0.5 0.4 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 0.2
0.5 0.5 0.4 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 0.3
0.5 0.5 0.4 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 0.4
0.5 0.5 0.4 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 0.5
0.5 0.5 0.4 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 0.6
0.5 0.5 0.4 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 0.7
0.5 0.5 0.4 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 0.8
0.5 0.5 0.4 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 0.9
0.5 0.5 0.4 1 0.8 0.2 0.02 0.01 1
28
Table 3.b - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with Mathematica 5.2 -
Output Matrix (τ = 0.4)
aτ−1t l
τ−1
t l
τ
t T
τ−1
t T
τ
t
imaginaryroot − − − −
imaginaryroot − − − −
imaginaryroot − − − −
0.0704 1(ret) 0.9375 0 0.02124
−0.0931 1(ret) 0.8333 0 0.0533
−0.1737 1(ret) 0.75 0 0.0749
−0.2184 1(ret) 0.6818 0 0.089
−0.2429 1(ret) 0.625 0 0.0975
−0.2542 1(ret) 0.5769 0 0.1015
−0.2559 1(ret) 0.5357 0 0.1021
−0.2499 1(ret) 0.5 0 0.1
−0.2376 1(ret) 0.4687 0 0.0956
−0.2194 1(ret) 0.4411 0 0.0894
−0.1955 1(ret) 0.4166 0 0.0816
−0.1656 1(ret) 0.3947 0 0.0726
−0.1293 1(ret) 0.375 0 0.0625
−0.0852 1(ret) 0.3571 0 0.0514
−0.0314 1(ret) 0.3409 0 0.0395
0.0354 1(ret) 0.326 0 0.0269
0.1228 1(ret) 0.3125 0 0.0137
0.2499 1(ret) 0.3 0 0
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Table 4.a - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with Mathematica 5.2 -
Input Matrix (τ = 0.15)
nτ−1 nτ τL t ψτ−1 ψτ sτ−1 sτ aτt
0.5 0.5 0.15 1.5 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.01 −1
0.5 0.5 0.15 1.5 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.01 −0.9
0.5 0.5 0.15 1.5 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.01 −0.8
0.5 0.5 0.15 1.5 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.01 −0.7
0.5 0.5 0.15 1.5 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.01 −0.6
0.5 0.5 0.15 1.5 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.01 −0.5
0.5 0.5 0.15 1.5 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.01 −0.4
0.5 0.5 0.15 1.5 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.01 −0.3
0.5 0.5 0.15 1.5 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.01 −0.2
0.5 0.5 0.15 1.5 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.01 −0.1
0.5 0.5 0.15 1.5 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.01 0
0.5 0.5 0.15 1.5 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.1
0.5 0.5 0.15 1.5 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.2
0.5 0.5 0.15 1.5 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.3
0.5 0.5 0.15 1.5 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.4
0.5 0.5 0.15 1.5 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.5
0.5 0.5 0.15 1.5 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.6
0.5 0.5 0.15 1.5 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.7
0.5 0.5 0.15 1.5 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.8
0.5 0.5 0.15 1.5 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.9
0.5 0.5 0.15 1.5 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.01 1
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Table 4.b - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with Mathematica 5.2 -
Output Matrix (τ = 0.15)
aτ−1t l
τ−1
t l
τ
t T
τ−1
t T
τ
t
imaginaryroot − − − −
imaginaryroot − − − −
0.1333 1(ret) 1(ret) 0 0
−0.225 1(ret) 1(ret) 0 0.2125
−0.2986 1(ret) 0.75 0 0.3
−0.325 1(ret) 0.6 0 0.3374
−0.3333 1(ret) 0.4999 0 0.3499
−0.3321 1(ret) 0.4285 0 0.3482
−0.325 1(ret) 0.375 0 0.3375
−0.3136 1(ret) 0.3333 0 0.3208
−0.2986 1(ret) 0.3 0 0.2999
−0.2804 1(ret) 0.2727 0 0.2761
−0.2590 1(ret) 0.25 0 0.25
−0.2341 1(ret) 0.2307 0 0.2221
−0.2055 1(ret) 0.2142 0 0.1928
−0.1724 1(ret) 0.1999 0 0.1625
−0.1339 1(ret) 0.1875 0 0.1312
−0.0883 1(ret) 0.1764 0 0.0992
−0.0330 1(ret) 0.1666 0 0.0666
0.0369 1(ret) 0.1578 0 0.0335
0.1333 1(ret) 0.15 0 0
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8 Appendix 2
Suppose that individuals’ preferences are represented by the following function:
Λ = U(c) + V (p) (25)
with U1, V1 > 0 and U11, V11 < 0 c represents a basket of market goods and p represents
the political activity non-market good, which is produced according to a CRTS production
function
p = H(l, d) = dH(
l
d
, 1) (26)
with H1, H2 > 0 and H11, H22 < 0. H is a standard function, d represents purchased
inputs to undertake political activities and l is time spend in political activities. The fixed
quantity of the worker input sells at the price c, again measured in terms of time. Suppose
now that the worker has a total amount of time T (which I normalize to the unity) he can
divide between working in the labour market for a market wage rate equal to w or using
to undertake political activities. Define the function:
X(l, d) = V (dH(
l
d
, 1)) (27)
Now, according to Paretian definitions, define l and p as complements when X12 > 0 and
substitutes when X12 > 0. the individual’s maximization problem is
6:
max
l
U(w(t− l)− cw) +X(l, d) (28)
First Order Conditions are given by:
V1(dH(
l
d
,1))H1(
l
d
,1)︷ ︸︸ ︷
X1(l, d) −wU1(w(t− l)− cw) = 0 (29)
First order conditions state that the gain due to an extra unit of time spent in polical
activities (X1(l, d) > 0) is offset by the loss in terms of foregone utility in labour market
(wU1(w(t − l) − cw)). Figure 2 shows the solution for l when l and d are complements,
while Figure 3 shows hte solution for l when l and d are substitutes. Thus if we suppose
that inputs to perform political activities are complements of time spent in these activities,
we assist to an increase in leisure time devoted to non-market work. An increase in time
spend in political activities requires a decrease in time spent in working. To evaluate
whether l and d are complements or substitutes we analyse the following expression:
marginalbenefitoftimespentinpoliticalactivity︷ ︸︸ ︷
X1(l, d) =
marginalutilityofpoliticalactivity︷ ︸︸ ︷
V1(dH(
l
d
, 1)) ×
marginalproductoftimespentinpoliticalactivity︷ ︸︸ ︷
H1(
l
d
, 1)
Notice that
∂V1(dH(
l
d
,1))
∂d
< 0, whilst
∂H1(
l
d
,1)
∂d
> 0. ThusX12 = −V11H21 ( ld )− V1H11 ld2 + V11HH1
which depends on whether the elasticity of the marginal product of labour with respect
to the time-goods ratio −( l
d
)H11
H1
is smaller or larger than the elasticity of marginal utility
with respect to the political activity −pV11
V1
, weighted by share of purchased inputs in
output,
d(H−H1l
d
)
p
.
Example 1
Suppose:
U(c) = γ ln(c)
6note the second order conditions entails w2U11 +X11 < 0
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V (p) = (1− γ) ln(p)
The “technology ”used by worker to produce the political activity exploits a CES pro-
duction function H(l, d) = (dρ + lρ)
1
ρ and the worker’s budget constraint is given by
c = w(t− l − c). Thus, the worker maximization problem can be written as:
max
l
γ lnw + γ ln(t− l − c) + (1− γ) ln(dρ + lρ) 1ρ
which entails the following first order conditions:
γ
1− γ =
t− l − c
dρ + lρ
lρ−1
which is independent from the wage rate, since the increased opportunity cost of the
political activity substitution effect is offset by the fact that higher wages make the worker
wealthier income effect.
Example 2 - Effects of labour income taxation
Take now the setup from Example 1 but now U(c) = ln(c− ς) and c = (1− τ)w(1− l) + t
where τ represents the labour income taxation and t a positive lump-sum transfer which
is a fraction θ of taxes collected by Government whose budget is g+ t = τw(t− l). Solving
the problem we obtain the following first order condition:
(1− τ)w
c− ς = 1
c = [1− τ(1− θ)]w(t− l)
and finally:
t− l = 1− τ
[1− τ(1− θ)] +
ς
w[1− τ(1− θ)]
Three case arise:
1. ς = 0 and θ = 0 ⇒ tax rate does not affect hours worked.
2. ς = 0 and θ = 1 ⇒ higher tax rates reduce hours worked since only substitution
effect holds.
3. ς > 0 and θ = 0 ⇒ higher tax rated increrase hours worked since the (negative)
income effect more than offset the (positive) substitution effect.
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